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A valedictory lecture is intended to be a farewell to a particular 
phase of one’s life. Today I bring to an end the chapter of my life 
at Leiden. There have been two major chapters in my life: one 
long and the other relatively short. The fi rst chapter, which 
lasted for sixty years, was my life in South Africa. This chapter 
was about growing up in a strange society; about trying to 
promote human rights in a racist and oppressive society; and 
about participating in the changes that took place in the 1990’s. 
This is a chapter that I aim to write about when I retire from a 
more active life! The second chapter, about which I shall speak 
today, started in 1998 when I was appointed Professor of 
International Law at the University of Leiden. It is a rich chapter, 
both in terms of changes to my personal life and in terms of 
professional experience. Professionally, my Leiden chapter has 
been dominated by three things. First, my work at the university 
- particularly teaching in its challenging advanced LLM 
program; secondly, my work at the International Law 
Commission, where I served as Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Protection from 1999 to 2006; and, thirdly, my 
experience as Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human 
Rights (and later the Human Rights Council) on human rights 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
In my talk today I shall address the future of international law, 
with particular reference to human rights. I am fearful of the 
future of human rights in today’s world. A whole range of 
factors place the international protection of human rights in 
danger. Today I shall talk about two of these factors which fall 
within my own experience. I shall approach the subject from 
the perspectives of the International Law Commission and 
Human Rights Council. First, I shall consider the implications 
of the different approaches to international law taken by 
academic lawyers and government lawyers for the future of 
human rights. Secondly, I shall consider the implications of 
divisions in the Human Rights Council over the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory for the future of human rights. After this I 
shall make some remarks about the role of the International 
Court of Justice in resolving these differences. I shall conclude 
with some comments about international law at Leiden.
Academic and Government International Lawyers: 
Different Perspectives in Relation to Matters 
Concerning Human Rights
It is trite that the content of international law has changed 
dramatically in the past fi fty years, largely as a result of the 
adoption of multilateral treaties dealing with a wide range of 
subjects, including human rights, trade, the environment, 
international crime and disarmament. But more dramatic, 
perhaps, has been the change in relation to thinking about the 
nature of international law, encapsulated in the notions of jus 
cogens and obligations erga omnes.
Traditionally international law was seen as a system of neutral 
rules, equal in status
1
, to which states had consented,
2
 expressly 
by treaty or impliedly by “constant and uniform usage”.
3 
A state 
retained exclusive jurisdiction over persons and events within 
its own territory, with the result that its treatment of its own 
nationals could not be seen as being of international concern. 
A state might protect its own nationals abroad, if it so wished, 
but the fate of foreign nationals abroad, although a cause for 
political concern, was not a matter of legal concern
4
 - as 
illustrated by the 1966 Judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the South West Africa Cases.
5
 Finally, although 
certain conduct attracted individual criminal responsibility, 
the absence of a permanent international criminal court 
ensured impunity.
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All this was changed. The sources of international law are no 
longer predicated on consent, and have been expanded to 
include General Assembly resolutions, the products of the 
International Law Commission, general principles (particularly 
in the fi eld of human rights and humanitarian law) and “soft 
law” contained in the declarations of international conferences. 
Some rules of international law, particularly those governing 
the use of force and human rights, are characterized as 
peremptory norms or norms of jus cogens and are viewed as 
being of a higher status than other rules. Domestic jurisdiction 
is no longer exclusive where human rights are concerned as a 
result of human rights conventions and the practice of the 
United Nations. A distinction is drawn between obligations 
that involve only the parties to a dispute and obligations that 
concern all states - obligations erga omnes. All states have an 
interest in enforcement of such obligations. Consequently, 
states now have legal standing to protect non-nationals in 
international litigation - according to the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility
6
 and a 
separate opinion of Judge Simma in the case of DRC v 
Uganda.
7
 Finally there is now a permanent international 
criminal court, in addition to several ad hoc tribunals, which 
ensures that there is no impunity for international crimes.
We academic lawyers are understandably excited by these 
changes and do our best to expand and extend them. All sorts 
of customary and treaty norms are claimed to be jus cogens and 
to create obligations erga omnes; non-law becomes soft law and 
soft law becomes hard law.
8
 As academic international lawyers 
outnumber international law practitioners, unlike the situation 
with any branch of national law, the opinions of academic 
lawyers become the law - at least as far as many academic 
lawyers are concerned. We have the gospels according to the 
American Journal of International Law, the British Year Book of 
International Law, the Annuaire Français and the Zeitschrift für 
Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht. State 
practice is overlooked in our enthusiasm to create a brave new 
world, premised on the principles of the new international law. 
A world in which state sovereignty is no longer a factor, a world 
in which the community of personkind is governed by the Rule 
of Law, a world in which peace and human rights are secure 
and in which the energy of personkind is addressed towards 
resolving poverty and inequality.
I may have painted an exaggerated picture of the academic 
perception of international law. But I fear that it is not too far off 
the mark. And here I speak as an academic lawyer who had 
virtually no contact with government or government lawyers 
until after the fall of apartheid in 1994 and, more accurately, 
until my election to the International Law Commission in 1997. 
I believed in the gospel of the law journals until I was brought 
down to earth by the experience of the International Law 
Commission. Over the years the International Law Commission 
has changed from a body of serious academics meeting on 
summer vacation in Geneva to a body of law advisers, 
ambassadors, government ministers and academics. The new 
international law vies with the old for acceptance in the process 
of codifi cation, state practice receives more attention than jus 
cogens and erga omnes and there is considerable skepticism 
about the attention paid to human rights in the international 
legal order. This was brought home to me sharply when as 
Special Rapporteur on diplomatic protection I attempted to 
portray diplomatic protection as a means of protecting human 
rights rather than the interests of the state. A proposal that 
sought to compel states to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of a national whose human rights had been violated by 
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the breach of a norm of jus cogens was unsuccessful, as were 
other proposals that aimed to inject human rights norms into 
diplomatic protection. Colleagues made it clear that human 
rights, jus cogens and erga omnes were to be treated with great 
caution in the codifi cation process. State interests also feature 
prominently in the legislative process, albeit in disguise - and 
invariably such interests are clothed in the language of 
traditional international law. For instance, I was surprised by 
objections raised by the United States to several of the draft 
articles on diplomatic protection. Despite the fact that the 
provisions were supported by constant and uniform United 
States practice, the United States argued that they did not enjoy 
suffi cient support in state practice to constitute customary law. 
Amazed, I approached a friend in the State Department, who 
explained that the previous US practice had been shaped by the 
fact that until recently the US saw itself as a plaintiff state. Now 
that it had become a respondent state in international litigation 
it could no longer accept such rules. Hence the argument that 
they were unsupported by state practice.
New international law does, at least, receive a fair hearing in 
the International law Commission. This is less the case in the 
Sixth Committee - the legal committee of the General 
Assembly. While in the Commission on Human Rights - now 
the Human Rights Council - which I have experienced since 
2001 - the “old” law prevails.
The harsh reality is that the battle for the new international law 
is far from won, particularly in the fi eld of human rights. 
Respect for the domestic jurisdiction of states still features 
prominently in the practice of states and regional 
arrangements in Africa and Asia, despite the fact that appeals 
to the protection of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter are rare. 
Unfortunately this is too little appreciated by Europeans who 
often see the world through the spectacles of their own 
achievements in the internationalization of human rights. 
Consent is still the basis of international law and soft law 
remains non-law. Jus cogens and erga omnes are seen as 
foreign maxims of no practical signifi cance.
The refusal of most states to accept the new international law 
must be seen in conjunction with their refusal to take human 
rights seriously. Despite the plethora of human rights 
conventions, the enforcement of human rights protection 
remains weak outside Europe. States parties to human rights 
conventions are frequently late in their reporting. Enforcement 
by inter-state claims under human rights conventions is 
unheard of outside Europe, and even here it is rare. The 
International Criminal Court has not provided the deterrence 
that was expected: I know of no prosecution before domestic 
courts under the Rome Statute outside Europe, and the ICC 
itself is engaged in only its fi rst prosecution. The main human 
rights offenders remain beyond the reach of human rights 
conventions or the Rome Statute and only the political organs 
of the United Nations may take action against them. And now 
there is new support for such offenders in the form of an 
argument raised by South Africa in the Security Council in 
respect of human rights violations in Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe. The Security Council is illegitimate by reason of its 
composition which means that its powers should be strictly 
construed. As a consequence the notion that human rights 
violations may constitute a threat to international peace - a 
notion that ironically has its origin in UN resolutions on 
apartheid - is no longer to be accepted! Instead all human 
rights issues should be referred to the Human Rights Council, 
where they belong.
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The Human Rights Council: Different Perspectives 
on Palestine
This brings me to the second section of my lecture: Human 
Rights and the Human Rights Council.
I was appointed as Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to the 
Commission on Human Rights in 2001. I now report to its 
successor, the Human Rights Council. I visit the region twice 
each year in order to prepare my reports.
The Human Rights Council, to put it mildly, has not got off to a 
good start. It is rightly said that it is too politicized. I share many 
of the criticisms of the Human Rights Council; indeed I fear it 
will prove to be little different from its predecessor. The main 
complaint is that the Council has devoted a disproportionate 
amount of attention to the OPT, at the expense of more pressing 
problems - such as Darfur and Zimbabwe.
Viewed from the perspective of the West this is true. However, 
viewed from the perspective of the Rest of the World (ROW), 
particularly Asian and African States, this emphasis is justifi ed 
as the treatment of the Palestinians is, as far as the ROW is 
concerned, the most important human rights issue facing the 
world. I wish to briefl y examine these different perspectives 
and their implications for human rights. In my view an 
understanding of this matter is crucial for an understanding of 
the actions of the Human Rights Council. 
The ROW sees the OPT in much the same way as the world 
saw apartheid for thirty years. Like apartheid it has been before 
the United Nations since its inception. Like apartheid in 
Namibia / South West Africa, the dispute over the OPT has its 
roots in the League of Nations’ mandate system, and the 
obligations of the United Nations towards a former mandated 
territory. Like apartheid, which sprung to world attention 
following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the issue of the 
OPT became more pressing in the 1960’s following the six-day 
war of 1967. Like apartheid, there is a structural dimension: not 
institutionalized racism but military occupation. Like 
apartheid, the military occupation, coupled with settlements, 
resembles colonialism. Like apartheid, the OPT represents the 
subjugation of a developing country or people by a Western-
affi liated regime. Like apartheid, there are serious continuing 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law by the 
occupying power. Like apartheid, there are numerous 
resolutions of the United Nations condemning actions of Israel 
as contrary to international law. Unlike apartheid, however, the 
Security Council cannot be expected to take action on the 
treatment of Palestinians because of the veto of the United 
States, and sometimes the Western powers. This explains why 
the ROW has turned to the Human Rights Council. Whereas 
states opposed to apartheid could appeal - sometimes 
successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully - to the Security 
Council for redress, states concerned about the human rights 
situation in the OPT have no alternative but to appeal to the 
Human Rights Council.
Today I do not wish to be drawn into the question whether 
Israel’s occupation of the OPT is similar to apartheid - a 
comparison which has received new attention in the West as a 
result of the publication of Jimmy Carter’s book Palestine : 
Peace or Apartheid. There are clearly important differences 
between military occupation and institutionalized race 
discrimination (apartheid), but at the same time there are 
similarities that cannot be ignored. But this is not the point. 
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The point is that the ROW expects the West to respond to the 
Palestinian question in the same way that it responded to 
apartheid - with action through the United Nations, through 
governments and through civil society. 
The West does not see the OPT as the ROW sees it. This is 
refl ected in the interventions and negative voting by the West 
in the Human Rights Council; by vetoes and abstentions in the 
Security Council and General Assembly; and by the de facto 
imposition of economic sanctions against the Palestinian 
people. There are a number of reasons for this, including the 
following: First, the West believes there are more pressing 
human rights issues. Secondly, the Palestinians are perceived to 
be on the wrong side in the war on terror. Thirdly, there is 
sympathy for Israel and all its actions resulting from an 
unarticulated awareness and understandable remorse fl owing 
from the suffering of Jewish people at the hands of Europeans 
in World War II.
Failure of the West to take Palestine seriously will have serious 
consequences for the Human Rights Council in particular and 
human rights in general. The Human Rights Council will 
become a disaster; and the ROW will obstruct action on issues 
such as Darfur. The West cannot expect the ROW to take issues 
it regards as important seriously if it persists in its present 
attitude to the OPT. For the ROW the issue of Palestine has 
become the litmus test for human rights. If the West fails to 
show concern for human rights in the OPT the ROW will 
conclude that human rights is a tool employed by the West 
against regimes it dislikes and not an objective and universal 
instrument for the measurement of the treatment of people 
throughout the world. 
I do not wish to underestimate the diffi culties faced in 
searching for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The 
location of the boundary between the two entities, the 
dismantling of settlements and the wall, the status of East 
Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees 
remain serious obstacles to a peaceful settlement that require 
both understanding and compromise. These matters call for 
urgent attention from the West. At the same time the ongoing 
violation of human rights and the humanitarian disaster in the 
Territory cannot be brushed aside as the preoccupation of the 
developing world. They must be addressed.
The International Court of Justice and Competing 
Perspectives 
I have suggested that competing perspectives threaten the 
future of the international protection of human rights. First, 
the enthusiastic promotion of the new international law by 
academic activists runs the risk of causing a backlash among 
government lawyers (and hence States) that may harm the 
development of international law. Secondly, the failure of the 
West to approach the treatment of Palestinians in a fair and 
evenhanded manner endangers both the Human Rights 
Council and the future of human rights. Happily, there is one 
institution that seems to have got it right - the International 
Court of Justice.
The International Court of Justice has approached the new 
international law in a cautious, balanced and principled manner. 
While the notion of obligation erga omnes is largely of its own 
making,
9
 the Court has dealt with it with great caution. In the 
East Timor case
10
 the Court acknowledged that the right of self-
determination has an erga omnes character but refused to allow 
this to override the principle that the court should not rule on 
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the lawfulness of the conduct of a state not a party to the 
proceedings. In DRC v Uganda
11
 the Court side-stepped the 
question of the standing of a state to protect non-nationals 
against human rights violations where the jurisdiction of the 
court is not in issue;
12
 a course it again followed in Bosnia v 
Serbia.
13
 Only in the Wall Advisory Opinion
14
 has the Court 
given practical effect to the concept of obligation erga omnes.
15
 
Jus cogens - the concept of the peremptory or higher norm - 
has been approached with even greater caution. In cases such 
as the Arrest Warrant
16
 the Court refrained from even 
mentioning the concept of jus cogens, despite the fact that 
Belgium argued that immunity could not apply where a norm 
of jus cogens had been violated. And where it did at last 
acknowledge the existence of peremptory norms in DRC v 
Rwanda,
17
 the court refused to allow the fact that genocide 
might be characterized as a norm of jus cogens to override the 
requirement of consent to jurisdiction.
Generally, it seems that the approach of the Court is to 
acknowledge the existence of the new international law, and in 
this way to prepare or educate states, but to apply it with great 
caution so as not to frighten states by confronting them with 
doctrines that they may as yet be unready to accept. This 
coincides broadly with the decision of the International Law 
Commission not to press for a convention on State 
Responsibility immediately in the light of likely state resistance 
to its provisions on erga omnes and jus cogens.
The Advisory Opinion of the International Court on the Wall 
that Israel is presently building in Palestinian Territory is 
signifi cant in three notable respects. First, because it rejected 
the pleas of Western nations that it should refuse to give an 
opinion. Secondly, because it made a number of important 
fi ndings on the law - that the Wall is illegal and should be 
dismantled; that the Fourth Geneva Convention governs 
Israel’s responsibilities in the OPT; that settlements are 
unlawful; that the regimes of both human rights and 
international humanitarian law apply in the OPT; and that the 
Palestinian people have the right to self-determination. 
Thirdly, the court found that the obligations violated by Israel 
included certain obligations erga omnes with the consequence 
that states were under obligation not to recognize the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction of the wall and to 
ensure that Israel complied with its obligations under 
international humanitarian law.
It is sad that this clear and helpful advisory opinion has been 
ignored or abandoned by the Quartet, the body designated by 
the Security Council to promote a peaceful settlement in the 
region. No statement by the Quartet mentions the advisory 
opinion at all, and scant attention is paid to the wall or human 
rights. The Quartet, comprising the United States, the EU, the 
UN and the Russian Federation, is essentially a body of the West, 
led by the US and the EU. In discarding the Court’s advisory 
opinion the West has again behaved very differently from the 
manner in which it behaved in respect of South Africa. The 
Court’s advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
18
 was 
used as an authoritative guide to states and the United Nations 
in their approach to South Africa’s occupation of Namibia, but 
this has not happened in the case of the Wall opinion.
The West is understandably proud of its commitment to the 
Rule of Law in international affairs and disdainfully contrasts 
its own attitude with that of the ROW. But, again, the West’s 
10
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position on Israel / Palestine raises questions about its 
commitment to the Rule of Law. The resolution of legal 
disputes by judicial means is a major component of the Rule of 
Law and the referral of legal disputes to the International 
Court of Justice has generally featured prominently in the 
foreign policies of the West. It is therefore strange that, despite 
the wide range of legal disputes presented by the Israel / 
Palestine confl ict, the West opposed the rendering of an 
advisory opinion by the Court; and once an opinion was given 
that provided an answer to many legal questions, the West 
should, through the Quartet, ignore this advice. 
While an advisory opinion is not binding on states, it is surely 
binding on the United Nations if it approves the Opinion - as 
it did in General Assembly resolution ES - 10/15 of 20 July 2004, 
adopted by 150 votes in favour, 6 against and 10 abstentions. 
This makes the position of the United Nations in the Quartet 
untenable. As a member of the Quartet it is surely bound to 
ensure that this body is guided by the Opinion. But instead it is 
a party to Quartet decisions that simply ignore the Opinion.
The Quartet itself is an interesting body for legal consideration. 
While its origins are to be found in an informal decision of the 
Security Council - led as usual by the permanent members - it 
lacks any constitutional basis. It was not created by formal 
resolution of the Council and is largely unaccountable to the 
Council. Moreover, it is a party to the imposition of economic 
sanctions against the Palestinian people but has not followed 
the procedures for economic sanctions prescribed by the UN 
Charter. Arguably, the US, the EU and the Russian Federation 
are free to impose economic sanctions, but the position of the 
United Nations is less sure as the Charter contains prescribed 
procedures for the imposition of sanctions.
Questions of this kind are raised by the ROW in respect of the 
West’s attitude towards the Israel / Palestine confl ict and 
further explain why the ROW has chosen to use the Human 
Rights Council as an instrument for action. Let me repeat, I am 
critical of the Human Rights Council. I wish it would start 
addressing human rights situations in other parts of the world 
as well as the OPT. But I understand full well why it places the 
OPT at the top of its agenda and why it will continue to do so 
until there is progress on Palestinian statehood. And, it is clear 
that there can be no progress without even-handed, fair 
pressure on both Israel and Palestine from the West. 
Leiden 
Ever since my days as a law student in South Africa, Leiden has 
had a special meaning for me. At the University of 
Stellenbosch, where I studied, all my law professors had studied 
at Leiden. We - law students in Afrikaans - language 
universities in South Africa - were led to believe that Leiden 
ranked higher than Oxford/Cambridge or Harvard/Yale as a 
place of legal learning. Later, when I had come to more 
realistically assess Leiden’s place in the legal universe, I was 
confronted with the genius of Grotius and the inspiration of 
the Grotian tradition. So I persisted, and still do persist, in my 
belief that Leiden is one of the greatest universities in the 
world, particularly in the fi eld of international law. 
Consequently it was a great honour to be appointed as 
Professor of International Law at Leiden in 1998. I will not 
deny that it was a hard decision to leave South Africa, in whose 
life I was deeply entrenched. I twice declined Leiden’s approach 
and it was mainly due to Hein Schermers’ persistence that I 
accepted. I am particularly grateful to Hein for his 
perseverance. When I came to Leiden I found him a good 
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colleague and inspiring lawyer, one to whom I could always 
turn for advice and a friendly chat. I miss him.
At Leiden I found myself part of a fi ne tradition of 
international lawyers. I succeeded in a direct line to van 
Eysinga, Telders, van Asbeck, van Panhuys and Kooijmans. But, 
of course, the Leiden school of international law also embraces 
scholars such as van Vollenhoven, Kalshoven and Schermers. It 
is diffi cult to bring all these distinguished lawyers, with their 
rich intellects and diverse experiences, into one school of 
thought. However, I would not, I believe, be wrong in saying 
that they belong to the Grotian tradition - a tradition that sees 
international law as a system of law that serves the interests of 
the international community as a whole and the interests of 
humanity rather than the narrow interest of state sovereignty. 
Happily my successor, Nico Schrijver, also shares this approach 
to international law.
I was professor at Leiden for eight years. I cannot pretend that all 
my time at Leiden was happy. The “reorganization” of the 
Faculty was a diffi cult time as it resulted in the loss of two 
valuable members of my staff. I was also surprised that my offer 
to the “reorganization dean” to assist in fund-raising, based on 
my success in this area in South Africa, was turned down with 
the comment that “in the Netherlands we save money rather 
than raise it”!! Happily this is now past history. The Faculty is 
fi nancially secure, and under the wise leadership of Carel Stolker. 
We have moved into a beautiful new building, which a law 
faculty as distinguished as that of Leiden truly deserves. 
Now let me say a few words about the Grotius Centre for 
international legal studies. This Centre owes its creation to the 
work of many, but I think I can claim some credit for the 
original idea of such a Centre. I had, and still have, a vision of a 
great international law centre situated in the international law 
capital of the world that would become the center for 
international law learning in Europe. It would be a centre that 
accommodates all Leiden’s graduate teaching, in a scholarly 
environment with a fi rst-class library and adequate teaching 
and offi ce space. Progress has been made with the Grotius 
Centre situated in beautiful premises in the Lange Voorhout. 
But it still falls short of the original vision: it has no real library 
and graduate teaching at Leiden - in the form of the advanced 
LLM degree - is endangered. There is clearly a case for vigorous 
fund-raising for the Grotius Centre and for serious attention to 
the future of the advanced LLM.
This brings me to the LLM degree. I was appointed at Leiden to 
promote the LLM degree and I saw this as my principal task. I 
transformed the degree from a degree which included non-
international law topics to a pure international law degree with a 
specialization in international criminal law. The success of the 
degree can, I believe, be measured by the number of Leiden 
graduates who today work in the international criminal 
tribunals in the Hague and in intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations engaged in the practice of 
international law throughout the world. For me this was the 
happiest teaching experience of my life. I no longer had to justify 
the existence of international law, as I had been compelled to do 
in South Africa. Instead I was confronted, each year, with a 
diverse, bright and highly enthusiastic group of students. I hope 
they learned something from me. Certainly I learned much from 
them. Although I had a heavy teaching load, I can honestly say 
that I looked forward to and enjoyed every lecture. It was good 
to end my teaching life on such a high note.
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On the subject of the LLM, I wish to thank Thomas Skouteris 
and Beatrice Sicouri for all the effort they have made over the 
years to make a success of the programme.
It is sad that the introduction of the new BAMA degree at 
Leiden threatens the survival of the proper or advanced Leiden 
LLM degree. The decision to describe the MA component of the 
BAMA as an “ LLM” , instead of LLB (which would bring it in 
line with the four year LLB of most Anglo-Saxon universities) or 
M Juris, makes it impossible for students to distinguish clearly 
between the undergraduate LLM degree and the post-graduate 
LLM degree, now named the Advanced LLM degree. Inevitably 
students are opting for the cheaper and less demanding LLM 
degree. This has serious implications for both the Grotius 
Centre, whose very existence is premised on the advanced LLM 
degree, and the reputation of international law at Leiden. Today 
the reputation of a university as a school of international law 
depends largely on the success of its post-graduate LLM - that is 
an LLM for students who are already qualifi ed in law and have 
had several years of experience in legal practice.
A word about PhD students. I have been privileged to have a 
number of fi ne PhD students with whom I have enjoyed 
working and from whom I have learned much. I think here 
particularly of Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany and Annemarieke 
Vermeer-Künzli who have probably assisted me more than I 
have assisted them. 
I have enjoyed my years at Leiden immensely. For this I wish to 
thank many: Carel, Nico, Larissa, academic colleagues, 
administrative “medewerkers” and, above all, several 
generations of students. 
I also wish to thank those who have organized today’s seminar 
and valedictory lecture: Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, Ingrid 
van Heeringen and Esther Uiterweerd.
I said at the beginning of my lecture that my personal life had 
also changed since coming to Leiden. I married Ietje and 
extended my family to include a Dutch component in addition 
to the South African component.
Today my daughter, Jackie, represents the South African 
component. I wish to thank her for being with us today. I am 
proud that she is a human rights lawyer, concentrating on 
social and economic rights in the new South Africa.
Thanks, too, to my Dutch family for being here today and for 
having accepted me so completely.
Last, but certainly not least, my thanks go to Ietje, who has 
fi lled my life for the past seven years and will, I hope, continue 
to do so for many years to come.
The future of International Law …
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